




The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation King, Gary, and, Christopher J. L. Murray. 2002. Rethinking human security. Political Science Quarterly
116(4): 585-610.
Published Version doi:10.2307/798222
Accessed February 18, 2015 6:21:28 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4313305
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH repository, and is made available under the
terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-
3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAAAlthough YIHS is most useful for developing the population measures of 
human security described in the next section, we also define a measure that may 
be more intuitive for some purpose at the individual level of  analysis. Thus, 
Individual Human Security (IHS) is the proportion of the lifespan that a person 
could reasonably aspire to that he or she can expect to spend outside the state 
of  generalized poverty. This measure, which ranges from zero to one, controls 
for differences in age. YIHS and IHS are objective measures and so may di- 
verge from an individual's perceived human security. While enhancing per- 
'  ceived human security is an important goal in its own right, the focus of  our 
concern is on objective levels of  individual and population human security. 
We have formalized these measures of  human security QS  including dis- 
count rates so that risks of  entering into a state of  generalized poverty in the 
distant future may be weighed as less important than risks in the near future. 
Discounting future well-being, or in the present case the risks of being impover- 
ished, has long been debated.41  While it is our general view that future risks 
should be considered as important or nearly as important as more proximal 
risks of poverty, the formulation allows for any plausible discount rate. Current 
practice in a number of fields, such as cost-effectiveness analysis of health inter- 
ventions, has slowly gravitated to using low positive discount rates of 3 percent 
or less per year.42  Obviously, once the hard work is done to collect the necessary 
measures, alternative discounting schemes could also be computed for com- 
parison. 
Population Human Security 
For the purposes of informing debates on development and security policy, we 
also provide a definition of  population years of  human security based on two 
ways of  aggregating YIHS. The simplest measure is the average of  YIHS for 
everyone in the relevant population. If YIHS is 25 for half the people and 35 
for the other half, then population human security would be 30. For many uses, 
this direct average is the most appropriate measure. However, it is sensitive 
to differences in the population age distribution. If  one population is older on 
average than another, ceteris paribus, it will have a lower population human 
security. In a strict sense, this is correct. The older population has an expecta- 
tion of living fewer years above the generalized poverty threshold. But for some 
comparative purposes, we might like a measure that is unaffected by the age 
41 F. P. Ramsey, "A Mathematical Theory of  Saving," Economic Journal 38 (December 1928): 
543-59;  R. C. Lind, ed., Discounting for the Time and Risk in Energy Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1982); Stephen A. Marglin, "The Social Rate of  Discount and the Optimal Rate of 
Investment," Quarterly Journal of Economics 77 (February 1963): 95-111;  Derek Parfit, Reasons and 
Persons (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1984);  Amartya K. Sen, "Isolation, Assurance and the 
Social Rate of Discount," Quarterly Journal of Economics 81 (February 1963): 1123-4. 
42 For example, Marthe R. Gold, Joanna E. Siegel, Louise B. Russell, and Milton C. Weinstein,  eds., 
Cost-Efectivene in Health and Medicine (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). RETHINKING HUMAN SECURITY  1  597 
distribution of  the population. For such comparative use, we propose to com- 
pare groups on the basis of  population years of  human security at birth.43  The 
average value of  YIHS for newborns today, just  like period life expectancy 
(which is life expectancy at birth), is not affected by the age structure of  the 
population and to a considerable extent reflects a broad range of  future risks 
of  survival and generalized poverty in the future. 
Both population years of  human security and population years of  human 
security at birth are measured on the same intuitive scale as the familiar mea- 
sures of life expectancy and life expectancy at birth, respectively. They measure 
the average number of years members of  a given population can expect to live 
(starting from either observed ages or at birth) outside of  the state of general- 
ized poverty. 
Both concepts exclude future generations in their calculation and thus 
avoid the standard paradoxes that would otherwise result. For example, with- 
out discounting, including future births means that population human security 
will be the same for almost all populations far enough into the future. Although 
challenging examples can be found (such as forecast epidemics of  infant dis- 
eases), we believe that defining population human security as a function of cur- 
rently living individuals is a reasonable and practical approach. Given the state 
of  the methods of  risk assessments, plausible measures of  population human 
security at birth would need to reflect known risks over the succeeding century. 
This is already a wide window of  evaluation, and extending it further into the 
future is likely to be empirically impractical. 
We also exclude from our population measure anything that affects the se- 
curity of  institutions, governments, or other organizations, unless it also affects 
individuals. This conception of population human security is thus a natural evo- 
lution of the literature since Richard Ullman wrote of focusing security on indi- 
viduals rather than states.44 
To measure human security in practice, a set of  domains of well-being must be 
selected. For each domain, a practical indicator must be constructed, as well as 
the threshold value below which an individual will be defined to be in a state 
of  generalized poverty. Two standard approaches to measuring well-being- 
money-metric utility and the human development index-are  instructive exam- 
ples for this purpose. 
43 Another option for an age distribution-independent definition of  population human security is 
to  use a standard age distribution to calculate age-standardized  population human security (See 0.  B. 
Ahmed et al., "Age Standardization of Rates: A New WHO Standard," GPE  discusion paper, no. 31 
(Geneva: World Health Organization, 2000). This measure would reflect the complete range of risks 
of survival and generalized  poverty over age and time but has the disadvantage of requiring the selec- 
tion of  a necessarily arbitrary population distribution for age standardization. 
"  Ullman, "Redefining Security." Some analysts favor using income per capita as a general, all-purpose mea- 
surement of well-being, as is amply illustrated by the international focus in pol- 
icy debates on income per capita. This approach is founded on the notion that 
each individual can best use the resources they command to maximize their 
own well-being and that interpersonal comparisons can legitimately be made 
on the basis of total income. The problems with this approach are well known,45 
and when measurement is feasible, most analysts try to include other domains 
as well. For example, three domains were included in the Human Development 
Index:46  income per capita, health, and education. Income per capita was not 
used as an intrinsic domain of well-being but as instrumental for the attainment 
of many other domains. Health and education were selected because they were 
considered intrinsic domains of  well-being and could be practically measured. 
We begin with the Human Development Index domains and so also use in- 
come per capita as instrumentally related to several domains of well-being, and 
also include health and education. Threshold levels of  economic well-being 
and health are clearly important enough to provoke violence. Education per se 
has not been that important, and so a plausible case might be constructed'that 
it could be omitted; but people have often fought over the cultural values re- 
flected in education. In addition, we wish to capture contributors to generalized 
poverty related to other basic freedoms. The UNDP recognized the importance 
of  political freedom and democracy, but could not find generally acceptable 
measures or weights and so could not include it with their other measured do- 
mains. Since we  only need a thteshold, and no weights, it will be somewhat 
easier for us to include variables like these. Thus, our suggestion for a parsimo- 
ni~us  set of  domains for measuring human security would be income, health, 
education, political freedom, and democracy. Many other domains of  well- 
being come in indirectly through these. In addition, any aspect of  well-being 
that directly affects life expectancy, such as the environment or biodiversity, 
will to an extent be automatically included in our measure of human security 
without having to establish a separate domain or threshold. 
For each domain explicitly included, we must select an indicator or indica- 
tors that reflect our current state of  information, as well as the threshold value 
below which an individual would be in a state of  generalized poverty. We now 
suggest measures of  each of  these domains, but we emphasize that our frame- 
work can easily accommodate any number of  additional domains. 
Domain-Specific Measures 
Although the System of National Accounts (SNA) was developed in the 1950s 
and has been nearly universally adopted, many variants of  income per capita 
45 World Bank, World Development Report, 20004  (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
46 UNDP, 1990. RETHINKING  HUMAN SECURITY  1  599 
could be used.47  Because we emphasize comparing the purchasing power of dif- 
ferent individuals across the world, we believe a good measure is GNP per cap- 
ita converted into international dollars using purchasing power parities.48  The 
World Bank has proposed that the global definition of  absolute (economic) 
poverty is less than $365 per capita per year in 1985 international dollars49  and 
this definition has now been widely adopted in the international community 
(for example, World Bank, DFID). According to this definition, 1.3  billion indi- 
viduals now live in poverty.50  Like any threshold, this one is arbitrary but has 
been set at such a low value that no one can credibly argue that individuals with 
less than $365 per capita are not in generalized poverty. While a good case can 
be made for raising the poverty threshold, our goal is to codify existing interna- 
tional consensus, and this is the closest (we have at present. 
Health factors are included in the definition of human security in two dis- 
tinct ways. First, survival is a critical component of  human security. Increasing 
mortality rates reduce life expectancy and YIHS, ceteris paribus. Fortunately, 
mortality forecasting is an active area of scholarly research and policy advice.51 
Second, individuals who are alive can fall below a threshold of health status 
that places them in a state of generalized poverty (for example, being paralyzed 
from the neck down). Considerable progress has been made in the develop- 
ment  of  comparable measures  of  the  nonfatal  dimensions  of  population 
health.52  A variety of  survey instruments have been developed such as SF-36,53 
Euroq01,5~  and WHODAS,55  which can be used to measure various aspects of 
47 There are two major choices. First, income per capita can be calculated on the basis of goods and 
services produced within a country (Gross Domestic Product) or it can be corrected for net property 
income from abroad (Gross National Product). The distinction is important for countries where remit- 
tances or income from investments abroad is substantial. The other key choice is the method of  convert- 
ing incomes per capita in national currency units into a common metric for the purposes of cross-national 
comparisons. Because official exchange rates do not reflect purchasing power parity for nontraded 
goods and services such as primary education, an alternative method based on measuring prices and 
computing purchasing power parities has been developed. See Robert Summers and Alan Heston, 
"The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded Set of  International Comparisons, 1950-1988,"  The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 106 (2): 327-68. Such PPP based comparisons  are expressed in "inter- 
national dollars," which is U.S.  dollars in purchasing power terms. 
48 The two main estimates of purchasing power parity, based on GDP and GNP per capita, are the 
Penn World Tables (Summers and Heston 1991) and the World Bank (World Development Indicators 
1999), respectively. Unfortunately, the correlation of these two measures is not high enough to make 
the choice ignorable. 
49 World Bank, 1990. 
World Bank, 1999. 
51 World Health Report, 1999 and 2000. 
52 Murray, Salomon, and Mathers, "A Critical Examination." 
"  J. Ware, SF-36 Health Survey, Manual and Interpretation Guide-The  Health Institute, New 
England Medical Center, Boston, Massachusetts. 
54 EuroQuol Group, "A New Facility for the Measurement of Health-Related Quality of  Life," 
Health Policy 16 (1990): 199-208. 
"  WHO-DAS, "Disability Assessment Schedule Version 3.la" (WHODAS-II), Geneva, World 
Health Organization, 1999. individuals' health. In parallel, work on how individuals value time spent in dif- 
ferent health states provides a basis for an overall assessment of the severity of 
health states.56  Health states are valued on a scale from 0 (death) to 1  (full 
health). Severe states such as quadriplegia score around 0.2 and severe depres- 
sion is 0.6."  We would suggest that any individual in a health state less than 
0.25 is in a state of  generalized poverty. 
Most of  the rich academic literature measuring democracy and political 
freedom considers each ~eparately.~~  One of the most commonly used measures 
is provided by Freedom House, a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization. Free- 
dom House judges democracy by quantifying political rights and political free- 
dom by quantitative measures of civil liberties, which "include the freedoms to 
develop views, institutions, and personal autonomy apaqt from the state."5g 
Over 800 other measures of  political freedom and democracy have been con- 
str~cted,~~  but almost all focus on evaluations of  governments rather than the 
political security of their citizens. This means that to measure the political com- 
ponent of generalized poverty properly, we need additional work. One reason- 
able threshold for the generalized poverty level for democracy could be the 
right of an individual to vote in at least one free and fair election (not necessar- 
ily national) that affects some important aspect of  that person's life. This is 
quite a minimal level of  democracy that the international community would 
surely want to improve, but without this right a person should clearly be seen 
as severely deprived. The analogous country-level measure might be the frac- 
tion of  adults who can participate in such elections. Interestingly, such a mea- 
sure would likely be greater than 0 percent and less than 100 percent in all but 
a few countries. 
The two main options for measuring educational attainment include liter- 
acy and average years of schooling. The advantage of literacy is that it incorpo- 
rates  a qualitatively meaningful threshold of  educational attainment in its 
definition. Most would agree that being illiterate places an individual in a state 
of generalized poverty. On the practical front, the problem with literacy is that 
it is notori~usly  difficult to compare across countries because self-reported lit- 
% P. F. M. Krabbe, M. Essink-Bot, G. J. Bonsel, "The Comparability  and Reliability of Five Health- 
State Valuation Methods," Social Science and Medicine 45 (December 1997): 1641-52;  J. Brazier, T. 
Usherwood, R. Harper, and K.  Thomas, "Deriving a Preference-Based Single Index from the UK 
SF36 Health Survey," Journal  of  Clinical Epidemiology  51 (November 1998): 1115-28;  E. Nord, 
"Methods for Quality Adjustment of Life Years," Social Science and Medicine 34 (No. 6,1992): 559-69. 
"  Christopher Murray and Alan Lopez, eds., The Global Burden of Disease, Global Burden of Dis- 
ease and Injury Series: vol. 1. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). 
58 See Kenneth A. Bollen and Pamela Paxton, "Subjective Measures of Liberal Democracy," Com- 
parative Political Studies 33 (February 2000): 58-86. 
59The  methods  of  Freedom  House  can  be  found  at  http://www.freedomhouse.org/survey99/ 
method/. 
Kenneth A. Bollen and Pamela Paxton, "102532: Cross-National Indicators of  Liberal Democ- 
racy, 1950-1990."  Data set at the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann 
Arbor, Michigan (http://urww.icpsr.umich.edu., 1999). eracy differs substantially across countries. Average years of  schooling, on the 
other hand, is a more robust measure of  educational attainment.61  An appro- 
priate threshold for average years of schooling might be five or six years, which 
reflects basic primary education. If a comparable measure of literacy becomes 
available, we would propose to use it also. 
Data Needs 
Measuring population human security requires as its starting point good infor- 
mation on the current and past levels of income, health, education, democracy, 
and political freedom for individuals in different populations of the world. To 
estimate generalized poverty, however, we  need information on individuals 
within populations simultaneously for these key variables. As the definition of 
generalized poverty is based on falling below the critical threshold in any of 
these domains, we require information on the levels of  each variable for each 
individual. In other words, information on health that cannot be related at the 
individual level to the information on income or political freedom cannot be 
used alone to estimate generalized poverty for a population. 
In practice, we could use available detailed data collections such as national 
accounts or vital registration to measure the variables separately, and a much 
smaller study to estimate their joint distribution. As a last resort, methods of 
ecological inference could be used to infer the joint distributi~n.~~  Scholars  have 
made substantial progress moving from national aggregate data on income to 
information on the distribution of  income.63  We believe that the natural next 
step, consistent with trends in data collection and with the movement toward 
human security, is to broaden the collection scheme to cross-domain measures 
at the individual level. In some cases, adding information on education and 
proxies of  wealth or income to routinely collected health information may be 
relatively inexpensive. This would be especially valuable since this health infor- 
mation is already collected in relatively standard forms in almost all countries. 
Not withstanding this agenda for the future development of  generalized 
poverty information systems, new methods need to be developed and applied 
to estimate the joint  distribution of  health, education, income, and political 
freedom. Fortunately, much can be done. For example, the World Health Or- 
ganization has a project to use national income and expenditure surveys, along 
with satellite mapping of the world's population and several geographic factors, 
to map the location of  the world's economically impoverished. Preliminary re- 
61 Average years of schooling for the population over 15  or over 25 has been called "human capital." 
See Jong Wha Lee and Robert Barro, "International Comparisons of  Educational Attainment," Jour- 
nal of Monetary Economics 32 (December 1993). 
For example, Gary King, A Solution to the EcologicalZnference Problem: Reconstructing Individ- 
ual Behavior from Aggregate Data. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). 
See the Wider database on income inequality-http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiidiid.htm. 602  1  POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 
FIGURE  1 
Estimated Distribution of the Poor in Africa and other Regions of the World,  1998. 
(Preliminary Results Based on The World Health Organization Mapping 
The Poor Project). 
, ,-. 
Note: This map demonstrates the feasibility of locating the economic poor in one of the most data-pwr 
regions of the world. Darker areas indicate a higher densityof poor people. Lighter areas indicate the rela- 
tive absence of poor people (the Sahara Desert in Northern Africa. where few people live, is a prominent 
pattern in the graph). 
sults of this project are illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the density of poor 
individuals  per  square kilometer  for  each continent.  This mapping of  the 
world's poor amply illustrates the major difference between those in absolute 
poverty and individuals whether rich or poor who live in the poorest countries. 
For example, in China, with an income per capita in 1997 International Dollars 
of 3070 per capita, over 200 million are estimated to be in p~verty.~  Other parts 
"World Bank, 1999. of  the world with high densities of  poor include Bangladesh, the Ethiopian 
Highlands, the Ganges Valley, and the Great Lakes region of Africa and Nige- 
ria. Work is underway to use other sources such as demographic and health 
surveys to estimate the distribution of individuals in different states of health.65 
Human security is a forward-looking  concept: to measure it today we must 
project generalized poverty and survival tomorrow. Projections require the de- 
velopment of methods of risk assessment with predictive validity. Such models 
can best be developed if  relatively long historical data bases are available so 
that the relationship between generalized poverty in each domain, and key so- 
cial, economic, cultural and political factors, can be explored. Risk assessment 
is thus a two-stage process. Key factors in accounting for large changes in hu- 
man security, such as wars, global warming, earthquakes, other natural disas- 
ters, and economic crises must be identified prior to projecting generalized pov- 
erty itself. In some cases, the areas of health, income, education, and political 
freedom require as a first step models to assess the risks of  these events. Below, 
we use the challenge of risk assessment of military conflict to illustrate direc- 
tions for progress in measuring human security. 
One important purpose of measuring human security is to provide individu- 
als with better information on their own human security. By so doing, we will 
tend to increase each individual's perceived human security because humans 
tend to overestimate threats to their own security. However, measuring human 
security will also be a critical input to public policy debates on how to enhance 
population human security. Individual risk assessment models naturally lead to 
actions to prevent or decrease the prospects of generalized poverty. Measuring 
human security will also focus the international foreign policy debate on the 
key contributors to human insecurity and thus improve public policy. To  facili- 
tate these goals, we propose that necessary data bases and models be developed 
that allow for the annual calculation of  this human security index. As with all 
efforts at comparative assessment, annual or periodic reporting of  population 
human security will help all countries understand their situation and inform 
them about where to make improvements. 
Human insecurity can code  from any source that increases the risk that people 
will remain in or enter into a state of  generalized poverty. Since gen6ralized 
poverty is a state that is often difficult to exit, existing in this state is one of the 
major threats to human security-that  is to being in generalized poverty in the 
future. Others include crime, military conflict (group violence), nonpeaceful 
transfers of  governmental power, diseases and other public health problems, 
65Emrnanuela  Gakidor, Christopher Murray, and Julio Frenk, "A Framework for Measuring 
Health Inequality," World Health Organization:  Discussion Paper, 29 July 2000 (http:/www.nt.who.int/ 
whosis/statistics/discussion~papers/papersos.pdf). acute environmental disasters (floods, droughts, earthquakes, weather storms, 
hazards from space, contamination), long-term environmental changes (global 
warming, ozone hole, water shortage, pollution), and economic crises. 
Some components of generalized poverty, such as income, health, and edu- 
cation, have witnessed considerable global progress in the last half-century. For 
example, the dramatic success of the international community in contributing 
to the expansion of  global life expectancy from 46.5 years in 1950-1955 to 65.4 
years in 1995-200066  is an example of  the progress that can be made. 
Categories of Eflorts to Enhance Human Security 
We categorize efforts to enhance human security, ranging from ex ante to ex 
post, as risk assessment, prevention, protection, and compensation. Risk assess- 
ment involves improving and communicating knowledge of  the risks that par- 
ticular populations will enter into or remain in a state of  generalized poverty. 
Prevention includes efforts to reduce these risks. Protection includes those ac- 
tions that decrease the harm from the events if  they occur. Compensation in- 
cludes efforts to provide financial or in-kind payments to those in generalized 
poverty. To arrive at these categories, we began with the scheme originally de- 
veloped by Lincoln Ched7  and then slightly expand it to highlight the impor- 
tance of  risk assessment as distinct from prevention. 
This categorization can be used  to construct more detailed operational 
strategies for increasing human security, based on new public policies and aca- 
demic research. For example, military conflict risk assessment should include 
research on forecasting military conflict, communicating the risks to those for 
whom it can make a difference, and developing surveillance systems. Preven- 
tion involves estimating causal models of  war, identifying modifiable causes, 
using risk assessments to target conflict reduction interventions, UN Security 
Council efforts, and national and international deterrence efforts. Protection 
from military conflict includes trying to change the weaponry of war, such as the 
campaign to ban landmines and cluster bombs, reinvigorating and extending 
the international laws that protect noncombatants, and protecting social service 
delivery and public health systems from combat. Compensation includes war 
insurance schemes (with risk rated on the basis of  existing forecasting models) 
and various types of  humanitarian assistance. 
Advantages of Improving Risk Assessment 
Even a cursory examination of the major threats to and strategies  for enhancing 
human security highlights risk assessment as the major important and underin- 
1 
"  United Nations, World Population Prospects, Vol. 1, Comprehensive Tables (New York: United 
Nations, 1998). 
67 Chen, "Human Security." vested area. Risk assessment is critical even for merely measuring population 
human security, but the advantages of improving risk assessment go far beyond 
simple measurement. 
First, improving methods so that meaningful risk assessment can be under- 
taken is an important research endeavor in its own right. This type of knowl- 
edge in and of  itself should be considered a public good. In addition, better 
knowledge of  specific risks might be used by the international community to 
make more effective public policy. Many efforts at prevention require knowl- 
edge of  risks; for example, effective response to human security risks is en- 
hanced by early warning systems and hence good risk assessment. 
We also know that much psychological and social-psychological research 
demonstrates that people tend to overestimate risks of the components of gen- 
eralized poverty.68  By providing high quality risk assessments and disseminat- 
ing this information to the public, individual perceived human security in many 
settings can be enhanced. In those settings where individuals underestimate 
their human insecurity, better risk assessment will allow them to take action at 
the individual, household, or government level to mitigate against the impact 
of these risks if they occur. 
Third, even if  individuals' assessments of their average future well-being 
are unbiased (that is, correct on average), psychological research indicates that 
people tend to evaluate the uncertainty in forecasts incorrectly. As such, better 
risk assessment that is widely and informatively disseminated can increase indi- 
vidual perceived human security directly by reducing forecast variances. Per- 
haps most obviously, better risk assessments make new interventions possible. 
For example, accurate hurricane forecasts eliminate most of  the immediate 
public health risk of these severe weather events. 
Our approach to using risk assessment in the definition of human security 
also has the advantage of encompassing  other important problems not affecting 
current human well-being. For example, biodiversity, which is seen by the sci- 
entific community as one of  the most important global problems, has little or 
no effect on current well-being. Approaches that provide an agenda for the in- 
ternational community that are not forward-looking would either ignore bio- 
diversity or append it to the agenda in a logically incoherent fashion. Under 
our approach, even though biodiversity has no effect on current well-being, it 
is essential in maintaining future well-being and hence plays a central role in 
improving human security. 
Risk assessment is important for forging policies based on the forward look- 
ing concept of human security, which can be far more effective than basing pol- 
icy on current well-being or generalized poverty. Since fighting the last war is 
obviously not the goal of the international community, we need to prepare re- 
sponses to what is likely to occur and not merely because prevention is less 
a  Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 606  1  POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 
costly than post-hoc responses. We hope that by illuminating the central role 
of  risk assessment in human security that we are able to point to areas where 
the academic community can help. Risk assessment is  under-researched in 
some areas and undervalued in others. Most of the social sciences, for example, 
have an understandable focus on estimating causal effects. What scholars need 
to understand, however, is that this focus need not come at the expense of mod- 
els that forecast well. Forecasts are often observable implications of  the same 
models used to estimate causal effects and can also be used to validate those 
same models. Put in reverse, many causal models now used can be marshaled 
to improve our forecasts and hence our measurement of  human security. 
We designed our version of  human security to be logically rigorous and to sat- 
isfy what appears to be the outline of  an emerging normative consensus in the 
international community. As we go to press, we can report on a commitment 
from the World kealth Organization to develop and apply new survey tools to 
measure health and related domains of  human security that follow the sugges- 
tions in this article. In addition, we note that in a recent speech, Mexican Presi- 
dent Vincente Fox has adopted the notion of  human security offered here. 
Normative Decisions 
Our concept is based on the security of  human beings, rather than the protec- 
tion of  state boundaries, with each individual contributing equally to popula- 
tion human security. The definition is forward looking: an individual's current 
security is a function of her or his future prospects. Most distinctively, human 
security is a function of the risk of  being below a threshold of well-being, what 
we call a state of  generalized poverty, rather than average levels of well-being. 
Using generalized poverty means that a policy based on human security fo- 
cuses effort primarily on human beings in the most dire situations. This is a 
logical extension of  what was effectively the perspective of  the international 
community in the domain of health when over the last forty years it generated 
unprecedented increases in the human life span by first addressing severe child- 
hood illnesses. The alternative view would be to focus on increasing average 
levels of  human well-being (otherwise known as human development). While 
we do not think human security has any necessary, absolute, or lexicographic 
priority as a goal of social policy in comparison to human development,  most in 
the international community seems to believe that it should have some priority 
except in somewhat unusual situations. 
Recent academic debates have led to related distinctions. For example, the 
prioritarian view holds that we should be interested in improving the well-being 
of  everyone with a special concern for the well-being of  the worst off.69  This 
69 Larry S. Temkin, Inequality (New York: Oxford Ethics Series, Oxford University Press, 1993). view can be distinguished from the classical egalitarian perspective, which is 
concerned with the entire distribution of  well-being across individuals. Thus, 
an egalitarian might agree with a public policy that sacrifices a degree of  well- 
being among the best off in order to reduce inequality,  but in some cases a prio- 
ritarian would object. 
Any priority for human security over human development should not be 
considered absolute, and we would not argue against public policy that en- 
hances human development simply because human security had not been max- 
imized first. But we believe that the international development and security 
communities are primarily focused on enhancing what we call human security. 
One way of  thinking about these normative preferences is to derive them from 
the deeper goal of  maximizing global human utility. From this perspective, the 
issue is how we make interpersonal utility comparisons. According to our inter- 
pretation of  the emerging consensus of  the international community, a small 
increase in well-being across the generalized poverty threshold produces a con- 
siderably larger change in utility than all but the most extreme changes in hu- 
man well-being at other levels. If this is true, then the priority of human security 
over human development is an automatic consequence. 
Agenda for Foreign Policy and Scientific Progress 
The definition and measure of  human security offered in this article are in- 
tended to formalize the emerging consensus in the international community 
over some of its most central goals. Since the idea of  human security is to im- 
prove the lives of people rather than improve the security of  national borders 
and key issues cross these borders, coordinated action by  the international 
community seems essential. Continued linkages and cooperation among gov- 
ernments, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and 
other parts of civil society will also be important. 
If  this is a reasonable statement of  the emerging consensus, future direc- 
tions for development and security policies will be greatly affected. We now 
consider examples of  policy and research strategies that would be affected 
within the four strategies for improving human security-risk  assessment, pre- 
vention, protection, and compensation. 
One of  the areas with the largest potential gains is improving risk assess- 
ment for the key causes of generalized poverty. Building the capacity in data 
bases and methods to undertake better risk assessment should be a central com- 
ponent of  a human security-focused foreign policy. The potential for improved 
risk assessment seems substantial in developing surveillance systems for new 
diseases, for example. Similarly, recent progress in risk assessment methods in 
political science means that for the first time some military conflicts can be accu- 
rately predicted, which may mean that risk assessment for some other key 
causes of  human security can also be rapidly improved. Such efforts could be 
greatly enhanced by forging new interdisciplinary ties. For example, political scientists have focused almost exclusively on elite political decisions to go to war, 
rather than war's ultimate public health consequences, and hence on only one 
aspect of risk assessment and prevention. Public health professionals have not 
taken advantage of these developments,  but have much to contribute in the areas 
of protection and compensation that political scientists have not engaged?O 
Better prevention strategies could be built on improved risk assessment. 
For example, in the area of  military conflict, better causal models and risk as- 
sessments might provide the opportunity for more focused foreign policy inter- 
ventions to reduce the risk of  conflict. Information given to the public in coun- 
tries or communities with elevated risks of conflict may in and of itself decrease 
the risk of  conflict. Other strategies for prevention that have been proposed 
and seem likely to be productive include improved international and national 
monetary institutions to reduce the risk of  economic crises, carbon-trading 
agreements to reduce green-house gases and the risk of global climate change, 
and improved rapid response teams to minimize disease transmission in re- 
sponse to reports from surveillance systems. 
While we believe, like others, that risk assessment and prevention may be 
the most rewarding direction for international efforts to enhance human secu- 
rity, there are also substantial opportunities in the area of  protection. The re- 
cent success in the campaign to ban landmines has opened up the prospect of 
other international agreements to make the weapons of  war more focused on 
combatants, thus reducing the insecurity of  noncombatants. International ef- 
forts to develop agreements on cluster bombs have a similar motivation. Other 
strategies for protection include efforts to enhance the quality of  buildings in 
earthquake-prone areas, as well as social mechanisms to protect vulnerable 
groups during economic crises. Humanitarian disaster response is also a form 
of protection. 
Finally, the international community could enhance efforts at compensa- 
tion by creating organizations to provide insurance against the financial costs 
associated with major risks to human security. Most nations effectively self-in- 
sure against the costs of  major catastrophes. The end result is that many find 
themselves facing long-term impacts of crises, whether Hurricane Mitch or  civil 
war. Traditional concepts of  insurance could perhaps be developed to provide 
nations at high risk of  these events with some financial risk protection. 
More detailed implications for policy  would, we  believe, follow from a 
structured application of  this framework to the challenges of  human security. 
At this point, building the evidence base for human security must be a priority 
if the focus of international action is to move from reacting to the latest humani- 
tarian crisis to effectively enhance human security through risk assessment, pre- 
vention, protection, and compensation." 
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Kenji Shibuya, Celeste Wallander, and Langche Zeng. We define individual human security to be YIHS, = J;  [I -  P, (t  1 ~)]~~(t)Wdt,  where P(t lo)  is the 
probability of individual i being in a state of generalized poverty at time t given a vector of thresh- 
olds  that define generalized poverty in critical domains of  well-being, conditional on being 
alive, and S(t) is the probability that the individual is alive at time t (the so-called survivorship 
function). Thus, if  an individual has an elevated risk of  death in the future, manifested by a de- 
crease in S(t), then their individual human security has decreased. The discount factor is T,  which 
equals one if  the prospect of being in a state of  generalized poverty in the distant future contrib- 
utes as much to years of an individual's human insecurity as the prospect of  being in generalized 
poverty in the near future. When A is less than 1  then the prospect of being insecure in the distant 
future contributes less than in the near future. In addition, P(t) and S(t) are each conditional on 
the information set available. In the present case, we define the information set as including all 
data available to at least one person, but not necessarily the person for whom we are calculating 
YIHS. Individuals who pay a lot of  attention, are smart, have sociological imaginations, have 
access to education and other knowledge, etc. will often be able to do better than a statistical 
analyst in forecasting, since they condition on more information. Others who are not so fortunate 
will probably not be able to forecast as well as a statistical analyst. Thus, part of  the goal of  the 
international community probably ought to be to equalize the information sets by distributing 
information about our forecasts. 
YIHS is analogous to the familiar period life expectancy measure, a calculation based on 
mortality rates by age observed for a single period of  time, usually a year. Period life expectancy 
is the average length of  life for a hypothetical group of  newborns born today who would experi- 
ence over the course of  their life currently observed mortality rates at each age. As such, period 
life expectancy is a convenient summary measure of  current mortality experience, even though 
it does not pertain to any actual group of  individuals. The proposed measure of human security 
is also based on the concept of  a life table with two key modifications. First, human security is 
by definition about the future and reflects our uncertainty about the future. Individual human 
security is thus always calculated prospectively. Second, we are applying the concept of life expec- 
tancy at the individual level. Period life tables are usually calculated for populations. At the indi- 
vidual level, however, the concept of  life expectancy or the area under the individual's survivor- 
ship function can be applied prospectively. 
To clarify potential differences between YIHS and individual perceived human security 
(PYIHS), we define the latter formally as, PYIHS, = ];[I  -  Pf(t(~~)]Sf(t)Gf(t)dt,  where T, is the 
vector of thresholds that individual i uses to define for herself a state of  generalized poverty. 
For example, auto workers in Detroit faced with the prospect of  unemployment may perceive 
themselves as insecure because the threshold they use to define deprivation is much higher than 
the global income poverty threshold. Sf(t)  is the subjective survivorship function for individual 
i and Pf (t  1 hi)  is his or her subjective probability of falling below the generalized poverty thresh- 
old. Individuals are well known to overestimate small risks and underestimate large risks,'l  so 
that their subjective assessments underestimate their human security in secure environments and 
overestimate them in risky environments. They also generally have a different information set 
available to make forecasts  than we use to define YIHS. This formulation of PYIHS also includes 
individuals' discount rate for the future. 
PYIHS is based on an individual's forecasts of the probability of being in a state of general- 
ized poverty, as well as on forecasts of  survival. This measure of PYIHS is strictly relative to the 
expectations  and subjective probabilities  of the individual. In other words, PYIHS could increase 
(as we all know from real life experience) not because the actual probabilities of generalized 
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Risk and  Rationality:  Can Normative and Descriptive 
Analysis Be Reconciled (College Park, MD: Institute of  Philosophy & Public Policy, 1988). poverty or survival have changed but because an individual's  subjective assessment of  these 
changes or their discount rate changes. 
Because we have chosen to define population human security in terms of forecasted general- 
ized poverty and survivorship does not mean that we think that an individual's own assessments 
of  their human security is unimportant. Clearly, if  population human security is high but most 
individuals perceive that their human security is low, this is a concern for public policy and for 
the community as a whole. Simply providing the public with better risk assessment may serve to 
enhance perceived human security if  people have overestimated risks of generalized poverty or 
death. Nevertheless, from the vantage point of development  and security,  we believe that popula- 
tion human security based on estimated probabilities is of the greatest policy relevance. 
IPHS may be based on the high discount rates that many individuals, especially the poor, 
use in their daily life decisions. We also know that discount rates used for policy decisions, such 
as investments in water or environmental  projects, are typically and reasonably much lower than 
individual  discount rates.72  Based on long-standing arguments against discounting future utilityJ3 
we believe that a reasonable approach is to evaluate the risks of generalized poverty five years 
hence as being as important or nearly as important as in ten years. 
Finally, we define 
where Sf  (t)  is the standard survivorship function for someone with the sex and age of individual 
i. The denominator is the discounted expected years of  life an individual can reasonably aspire 
to. In this way, if  an individual faces an increased risk of  death in the future, IHS will decrease. 
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